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On 18 September 2016, the legislative elections held in 
Russia resulted in an overwhelming victory of the 
governing party United Russia (UR), which won 343 
out of 450 seats of the State Duma. Despite this 
resounding triumph, the record low turnout and the 
economic and social challenges faced by the Putin 
regime suggest that the European Union (EU) will 
continue to face an extremely unstable neighbour in 
the years to come. This Policy Brief starts by recalling 
how Russian elites had responded to the 
demonstrations that had followed the last legislative 
elections in 2011. Against this backdrop, it interprets 
the results of the 2016 elections, emphasising how the 
lack of openness and transparency of the electoral 
process and the general economic and social 
challenges faced by Russia could soon undermine the 
stability of Putin’s regime. Based on this analysis, the 
Policy Brief discusses the implications of the vote and 
advances recommendations on how the EU could deal 
with Russia’s increasing foreign policy assertiveness in 
the short term and respond appropriately to the 
country’s volatile domestic context in the long term. 
 
The 2011 elections and their aftermath  
There was never any doubt that UR would win the 2016 
legislative elections, taking into consideration the 
political and electoral measures adopted after the 
controversial 2011 elections.  In 2011, the legislative 
elections and UR’s victory took place in a context 
marked by widespread systematic violations of 
electoral standards, strong media control and the 
disturbing announcement that Putin would again run 
for presidency in March 2012. As a result, thousands 
took to the streets in what have become the largest 
mass protests since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
To curb the deterioration of Putin’s legitimacy and that 
of the Russian political system, the government decided 
to intervene immediately after the protests started. 
One of the first changes consisted in amending the law 
on political parties in order to facilitate their 
registration. Also, to allow independent candidates to 
run for elections and to meet protesters’ demands at 
least to some extent, Putin decreased the 
Executive Summary 
> Despite United Russia's impressive result, 
winning 76.22 per cent of the seats in the Duma, 
the 2016 Russian legislative elections have been 
characterised by the lowest turnout since 1993. 
The new composition of the Duma does not 
reflect the economic and social challenges 
currently faced by the Putin regime. 
> Both the low turnout and the unrepresentative-
ness of the Duma suggest that opposing voices 
are not effectively integrated in the democratic 
process in the Russian Federation. As a result, 
significant protest potential looms in Russian 
society. 
> The Putin regime resorts especially to an 
assertive foreign policy to cover up domestic 
problems, making the country a continuously 
unstable interlocutor for the European Union. 
> To deal with this instability, the EU should adopt 
a strategy operating with two time horizons: in 
the short term, it should confront Russian foreign 
policy assertiveness with resoluteness and 
cohesiveness. In the long term, it should prepare 
itself for potentially major changes in Russian 
society, notably by building stronger expertise on 
Russia and its political system inside the EU and 
by more strongly engaging with Russian civil 
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parliamentary threshold from 7 to 5 per cent. The third 
major change presented as a step towards greater 
liberalisation was the adoption of a mixed unlinked 
electoral system. Under such a system, half of the 
candidates are elected from single-mandate 
independent district lists and the other half from a 
federal list of candidates in one federal constituency.  
Addressing the Federal Assembly in 2012, Putin 
defended this idea by stating that it would allow for 
more political competition, guaranteeing equal access 
to the media to all political parties. 
Finally, political elites also decided to address 
protesters’ general discontent over the opacity of the 
electoral process, and in particular the lack of 
independence of the Central Electoral Commission 
(CEC). The CEC was until March 2016 led by Vladimir 
Churov, a man who had already worked with Putin in 
the Saint-Petersburg Mayor’s Office in the 1990s. These 
personal ties and Churov’s boast of his exactitude when 
predicting the results of the 2011 elections at a meeting 
with then-President Medvedev, were seen as signs for 
the lack of independence of the CEC. To meet one of the 
main demands of the protesters, Churov was removed 
from his position and replaced by a prominent civil 
society leader and former Head of the Presidential 
Commission/Council on Human Rights, Ella Pamfilova. 
Pamfilova and her team managed to partially clean the 
tarnished image of the CEC, to the extent that the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) concluded that the 2016 elections had been 
administered transparently. 
Russia’s politics unravelled: interpreting the 2016 
election results 
On 18 September 2016, UR obtained 105 seats more 
than in the 2011 vote. It now has more seats than in 
past legislative terms. While both the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the Communists 
obtained slightly more than 13 per cent, and the pro-
Putin ‘A Just Russia’ halved its share of votes (about 6 
per cent), liberal forces failed to enter parliament.  
Following the legislative vote and the absence of 
demonstrations against the regime, one might be 
inclined to think that Russian voters rewarded Putin’s 
work. However, this depiction seems inaccurate. UR’s 
comfortable victory illustrates above all that the 
political and electoral measures taken in the run-up to 
the 2016 vote successfully helped to prevent the 
potential for disruption that was seen with the mass 
protests in 2011.  
At the political level, the post-2011 reforms have not 
resulted in an effective strengthening of democratic 
standards. Instead, they proved to be a sign of the 
Kremlin's ‘make-up tactics’, that is, attempts at 
changing the façade of the electoral and political system 
without touching its foundations. The main motive 
behind the reforms implemented after 2011 was thus 
not a genuine desire to liberalise and breathe 
competition into the Russian political system, but to 
showcase the image of the liberalisation of the system 
so as to avoid a repetition of the 2011 mass protests and 
a menace to Putin’s and UR’s omnipotence. For 
instance, the law on political parties approved in 2011 
did not translate into greater political competition. 
While in 2011, seven parties took part in the elections, 
but only four made it to the State Duma, in the 2016 
election, the number of parties increased more than 
tenfold, but only 14 met the criteria necessary to 
participate and just two more parties than in 2011 
obtained seats by single-seat constituency (one 
representative each for Rodina and Civic Platform). 
Furthermore, Putin’s proposal of a mixed unlinked 
electoral system was met with criticism by experts and 
opposition parties because it would permit UR (or any 
other party obtaining more than 30 per cent) to be 
overrepresented through wins in single-member 
constituencies. This system has proved successful for 
the regime because it was coupled with 
gerrymandering, namely the redrawing of the electoral 
map to merge areas where there is a concentration of 
inhabitants prone to voting against UR with areas where 
the party usually reaps good results.  
Not surprisingly, civil society organisations and think 
thanks, among them the Civil Initiatives Committee 
founded by the former Minister of Finance Alexei 
Kudrin, also saw the rather quiet election campaign of 
2016 as part of a strategy of the regime designed to 
reduce the turnout and minimise risks.  
Additionally, and more importantly, if the legitimacy of 
the elections is also based on the turnout, one may 
claim that it has weakened from 2011 to 2016, as the 
overall turnout decreased from 60.2 per cent to 47.8 
per cent. Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, the decrease 
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was more pronounced in Moscow and Saint-
Petersburg, often referred to as the ‘two capitals’, not 
only for their historical status of ‘capital’, but also 
because they are the two most developed and 
urbanised areas of the country. While in the 1990s 
demonstrations were largely regional and spread 
throughout the country, as of the early 2000s both cities 
have become the key locations of Russian citizens’ 
protest and remain strategic areas for future protests. 
Figure 1: Turnout of 2011 and 2016 legislative elections 
in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg 
 Moscow Saint-Petersburg 
2011 61.7% 54.5% 
2016 35.2% 32.5% 
 
Regime reactions to post-electoral potential for social 
unrest 
Even if no demonstrations have taken place after the 
2016 vote, one should be careful in assessing that 
protest potential has lowered when compared to 2011. 
Data on demonstrations since 2008 by the Russian 
Centre for Social and Labour Rights shows that since 
early 2015, labour protests in Russia have become more 
frequent and radical, with daily demonstrations 
throughout 2016. In this respect, more than half of the 
demands were related to delays in the payment of 
wages. The report concluded that, while the country 
witnesses an accumulation of quantitative changes, the 
protest movement has not yet evolved towards a more 
coherent structure, as demonstrations remain local and 
therefore isolated.  
These increased labour protests are a direct effect of 
the severe economic recession. While Putin’s model of 
stability worked fine throughout the 2000s, since high 
oil prices allowed the Kremlin to ensure growth and 
stability, at a time of crisis this model is coming under 
mounting domestic pressure. Low global oil prices have 
a dramatic impact on economies highly dependent on 
natural resources, and Russia earns half of the 
government revenues from resource sales. Additionally, 
the serious lack of technological capabilities to improve 
oil and gas extraction processes has further diminished 
state resources. All this has resulted in an ongoing 
rouble devaluation, with Russian households and 
companies struggling to afford foreign goods and 
services. To cope with the economic decline, cuts to 
welfare are expected in the 2017 budget, which will 
normally be approved in December 2016. The 
anticipation of the legislative vote from December to 
September 2016 (Duma elections have always taken 
place in December since 1993) can be seen as a tactical 
move to prevent oppositional parties and civil society 
movements from voicing criticism during elections. 
In a country facing a severe recession and increasing 
social discontent, elections should reflect citizens’ 
concerns and re-orient policy-makers’ choices. Yet that 
is not the case in Russia. Civil society demands are not 
channelled through the electoral process. Rather than 
being an opportunity to voice criticism, the vote allows 
elites to perpetuate their control over state resources. 
In this respect, Russian elections are not a real snapshot 
of the country’s situation but rather an expression of a 
virtual reality. 
To cope with internal challenges, the Kremlin has 
repeatedly recurred to an aggressive foreign policy. As 
part of this foreign policy, the Russian ruling elite has 
recurred to a mix of military force and other non-
conventional means such as humanitarian aid, 
economic measures, propaganda, and cyber-attacks. 
This approach usually fulfils manifold objectives, as it 
boosts the Kremlin’s popularity in the short term, unites 
and rallies the population behind the elites and detracts 
attention from domestic problems. In the light of the 
ongoing crisis, such tactics are likely to remain a major 
component of the Kremlin’s strategy. While Putin’s 
moves remain hard to predict, the attempt to cover up 
domestic troubles through assertive foreign policy is 
likely to remain a persistent trend over the next years. 
Implications for the EU’s relations with Russia 
In light of the multiple challenges faced by the regime, 
European policy-makers should be prepared to face a 
highly volatile neighbour in the coming years. This will 
require a strategy operating with two time horizons, 
designed to address Russia’s leadership in the short 
term, while reinforcing its contacts with societal forces 
in the long term. In the short term, deterrence at the 
military level should be coupled with constructive 
engagement on those international challenges in which 
the Kremlin shows more willingness to cooperate. In the 
long term, European policy-makers should take into 
account the possibility of a deterioration of Russia’s 
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domestic stability. To overcome this challenge, soft-
power measures designed to build knowledge about 
Russia in the EU and to reach out to Russian societal 
forces could be beneficial for the EU. 
In the short term, to limit the risk of military incursions, 
the EU should first and foremost be firm and keep the 
sanctions in place, with a particular focus on those 
targeting the military sector, in order to block Russia’s 
access to new technologies and instruments. 
Resoluteness and cohesiveness on sanctions is one of 
the key tools the EU has to curb Russia’s confrontational 
approach. Sanctions not only make access to tech-
nology harder, but if kept for a long time and agreed on 
by all member states, they will help mitigate the ever-
increasing negative image Russian elites have of the EU 
as a weak intergovernmental organisation whose 
internal tensions can be easily exploited. Perceptions of 
weakness are costly at this stage, hence the need to 
convey an image of EU unity and cohesion. 
Alongside short-term containment, and in a more long-
term perspective, in a conflict-ridden relationship like 
the one between the EU and Russia, economic 
measures should be coupled with more investment in 
the field of education, science and culture.  
First, research projects covering Russian domestic 
politics, economy, history or sociology from the Russian 
perspective(s), would help understand current 
developments and better foresee possible scenarios. In 
this context, the creation of a Committee of Historians 
or a division within the EU Liaison Committee of 
Historians, a committee composed of historians of EU 
member states working on contemporary history, 
devoted exclusively to the research of EU-Russia 
relations and Russian history as well as to the proposal 
of recommendations should be examined. This team 
could work with the communication team set up in 
2015 by the European External Action Service to raise 
awareness of Russia’s disinformation campaigns.  
Second, while in the past decade Russian civil society 
organisations (CSOs) strongly benefited from European 
aid, and among others from the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), since 2012, 
the Russian foreign agent law has affected funding 
opportunities. Under this law,  CSOs receiving European 
funding are obliged to register themselves as ‘foreign 
agents’, leading to additional bureaucracy and public 
stigmatisation, as the expression was used for 
espionage activities during the Cold War. Nonetheless, 
the EU should continue making funds available to 
Russian civil society. 
Third, it is fundamental that the EU contribute to 
shaping a pro-European Russian elite in the long term. 
Despite the fact that the current political climate 
discourages academic contacts, education remains a 
key component of EU soft power. Seeing that the 
number of Russian students and academics taking part 
in Erasmus exchanges is very low (1900 in 2015, 
according to the Commission), the EU should consider 
the creation of a specific scholarship programme with 
larger funds targeting Russian undergraduate and 
graduate students. This could provide a significant 
opportunity to educate young Russians in and about the 
EU and foster critical reflection on the Russian political 
system. Also, this measure would reassure Russians that 
the EU does not consider them collectively responsible 
for the ongoing escalations, and that sanctions are 
intended to ratchet up the pressure on the elites, not 
on the average citizen. 
Fourth, while space for human rights initiatives has 
been shrinking, the EU could and should open up 
opportunities for cooperation on other funding 
programmes than Erasmus+ or the Horizon 2020 
programme for research and innovation, in which 
Russian partners are allowed to participate. These 
examples could also be extended to the Europe for 
Citizens programme, which aims to “raise awareness of 
remembrance, common history and values”. In 
particular, commemorations in the 2016-2020 period 
are a cornerstone of both European and Russian history 
(i.e. the 1917 revolution, the end of WWI in 1918, and 
the beginning of the Cold War in 1948).  
Finally, greater attention should be devoted to tourism 
as a way to foster people-to-people contacts. A 
significant decrease in in Russian tourists to European 
member states as a result of harder economic 
conditions, rouble devaluation and expensive visa 
formalities has recently been observed. Although the 
EU does not have significant room for manoeuvre to 
deal with the economic situation and the rouble 
devaluation, more could be done on the latter. While 
negotiations for a visa-free regime are currently frozen, 
European member states should remove fees for 
Russian citizens, together with nationals from Georgia, 
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Kosovo, and Ukraine (all citizens currently pay a 
reduced visa fee of 35 EUR). The effect of this measure 
will be twofold: on the one hand, from an economic 
point of view, it will contribute to facilitate tourism; on 
the other hand, this unilateral measure will shape the 
perception that, despite cooling relations, the EU 
welcomes Russian visitors to Europe, also as a way to 
enhance people-to-people contact. 
Although these soft power measures will only yield 
results in the long term, they are paramount to 
understanding Russia and reinforcing ties with potential 
future Russian elites, and should therefore not be 
neglected in favour of purely economic or military 
options. 
Conclusion 
Following the 2016 legislative elections, the 
confrontational foreign policy the Putin regime has 
adopted to detract attention from domestic problems 
implies that relations between the EU and Russia are 
likely to remain highly volatile for years to come.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The unfolding of the elections and its results 
corroborate the make-believe nature of the political 
and electoral processes in Russia. The numerous 
institutional hurdles to conduct of free and transparent 
elections, as well as the acceptance of weak democratic 
practices over the years has turned such elections into 
a mere process of rubberstamping of the candidates 
backed by the regime and its media apparatus and of 
those tolerated by the government. 
As such, the electoral result demonstrates that the 
increasing social demands are not channelled through 
the democratic process, and could soon re-emerge in a 
more unpredictable way than they did in 2011. It 
follows that, in dealing with Russia, the EU should 
design a strategy addressing elites in the short term and 
societal forces in the long term. By coupling 
containment and soft-power measures bypassing the 
conflict-ridden context, the EU may be better prepared 
to re-integrate a new democratic Russia into Europe in 
the future.  
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